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ABSTRACT 
Since its inception, the field of game studies has pursued an attitude of exceptionalism 
that treats the videogame as a unique form that must be approached differently from 
the ways other media are studied. This stance is parallel to the exceptionalism towards 
humanity that continued to treat animals and humans as radically distinct concepts until 
the late twentieth century. By examining different aspects of videogame 
exceptionalism, particularly the fiction denial that considers the rules of games to be 
radically more important than their representational elements, an argument is advanced 
that videogame exceptionalism is distorting our understanding of both videogames and 
other forms of play and narrative. It is further argued that it is misleading to talk of the 
difference between videogames and other creative media without saying which genres 
are being compared within each medium. There is therefore a need for a 'game 
liberation' that will cease to treat the history and genealogy of videogames as 
constrained solely to digital artefacts – rather, a complete understanding of videogames 
requires an appreciation for their connectivity with the other forms of play and fiction 
that both predate it, and that continue to exchange conventions with it. 
Keywords: exceptionalism, videogames, representation, fiction, rules, tabletop games, 
narrative media, fiction denial, Juul's Trench, game liberation 
Short Description: Fiction denial claims that rules are more important than 
representation in videogames, and is an archetypal form of exceptionalism that treats 
videogames as radically distinct from other media. However, it is misleading to talk of 
the difference between videogames and other media without saying which genres are 
being compared within each medium. 
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THE EXCEPTIONALISM OF HUMANITY 
In 1978, the British philosopher Mary Midgley wrote her first book, Beast and Man, 
which attempted to liberate the discussion of humanity from the exceptionalism that at 
that point was commonplace. While other intellectuals were still focused upon those 
qualities that were purported to mark humans as different from other species, Midgley 
inverted this attitude and stressed the continuity between humanity and other animals. 
Gradually, Midgley's argument grew in persuasiveness and became supplemented by 
similar arguments by other philosophers such as Peter Singer (e.g. 1975) until 
eventually the exceptionalism that would treat humans as entirely disconnected from 
other forms of animal life came to be viewed as parochial and antiquated. Part of 
Midgley's argument rests upon the misleading practice of presuming that it was 
meaningful to talk of "the difference between man and animal" (Midgley, 1978, p. 335) 
as if this could be deemed to refer to a unified conceptual distinction. She observes that 
when making comparisons or distinctions between humanity and other animals, it is 
vitally important to know which animal is under consideration: 
Primates do not have big cooperative enterprises, nor therefore the loyalty, 
fidelity and developed skills that go with them. Nor do they have fixed homes 
and families. But the hunting carnivores do. And neither apes nor wolves have 
anything like the human length of life, nor therefore the same chance of 
accumulating wisdom and of deepening relationships. But elephants do. And 
no mammal really shares the strong visual interest that is so important both to 
our social life and to our art, nor perhaps needs to work as hard as we do to rear 
our young. But birds do. This is why it is vacuous to talk of “the difference 
between man and animal” without saying which animal (Midgley, 1978, p. 
335). 
In game studies, this same problem of exceptionalism appears in the consistent attempts 
to treat videogames as if they were an utterly distinctive medium, either incapable of 
adequate comparison with other forms or sufficiently different as to warrant strong 
ontological claims regarding their uniqueness. It is the purpose of this paper to argue 
that just as animals required a period of 'animal liberation' to secure the idea that other 
animals were indeed continuous with humanity  and thus had to be treated with greater 
respect, so game studies needs a period of 'game liberation' to develop the idea that 
videogames are no more unique than any other medium, and that they are indeed 
contiguous in numerous significant ways to narrative media such as film, television, 
novels and comics, and other forms of play such as board games, sports and children's 
games of make-believe, all of which deserve greater respect than game studies currently 
affords to them. 
To paraphrase Midgley's remarks, quoted above, novels do not have explicit choices 
that affect the unfolding of their narrative content. Nor do they provide their 
participants with any significant form of agency. But tabletop roleplaying games do. 
And neither novels nor tabletop roleplaying games involve the skilled operation of an 
interface device, nor therefore the potential for aesthetic expression through the form 
of control. But pinball tables do. And no other form of game produces richly 
interpretable audio-visual experiences capable of immersing participants in fictional 
worlds via their imagination. But movies do. This is why it is misleading to talk of the 
difference between videogames and other creative media without saying which genres 
are being compared within each medium. 
JUUL'S TRENCH 
In order to liberate games from videogame exceptionalism, it is necessary to examine 
some of the claims that have been used to assert the distinction of videogames from 
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other media. One of these issues dates back to the dawn of game studies – or at least, 
to the first issue of this journal, Game Studies, where Jesper Juul draws a seminal line 
in the sand between games and stories (Juul, 2001). The core of Juul's argument in that 
paper is that narrative media (such as novels, movies and comics) occur in the past and 
are thus fixed in their content, while videogames happen as you are playing and thus 
take place in the present. At the time, it was arguably necessary to make distinctions 
such as this in order to prevent game studies from being colonised by neighbouring 
disciplines like narratology that might have silenced the emerging voice of videogame 
scholars. However, this has long since ceased to be a valid concern. 
The argument Juul advances in this particular paper is not as plausible as it first seems. 
Any form of stage play that participates with the audience or environment (passion 
plays, for instance, or British pantomime) occurs just as much in the present as any 
videogame. Furthermore, both games and stories are constructed, scaffolded, or 
designed before they are experienced – the player of Halo: Combat Evolved (Bungie, 
2001) can no more prevent the ringworld from being destroyed than the reader of 
Ringworld (Niven, 1970) can prevent the spaceship from crashing. It should also be 
noted that Juul's additional concerns about the problems entailed in translating books 
and films to games are mirrored by the problems translating games of any given form 
into games of another – including between different videogame genres. Again, the 
attempt to promote an exceptionalism of videogames runs up against the problems of 
treating all other media (in this case, all other narrative media) as a unified phenomena. 
Clearer distinctions are needed to clarify both the difference and the continuity between 
videogames and narrative media. 
What could be called Juul's Trench represents an effective defensive measure, an 
attempt to institute something akin to the kaikin policy of Edo-period Japan that 
radically separated Japanese culture from the perceived threat of outside influence, and 
particularly from Christian missionaries which the Tokugawa shogunate viewed as a 
threat to their power (Laver, 2011). Just as Edo-period Japan was not entirely isolated 
– the Japanese continued to trade with Dutch, Chinese, Ainu and Korean merchants 
under strictly enforced conditions – so Juul's Trench failed to entirely isolate 
videogames from other media. Commercial videogames continued to import 
representational conventions from films, albeit with some adaptation (e.g. Wei and 
Calvert, 2013), as well as exporting their own conventions back into films (Brooker, 
2009), and similar relationships can be traced between videogames and tabletop games, 
especially roleplaying games (Bateman, 2011).  
Yet inside the trench, game scholars maintained their exceptionalism and continued to 
treat videogames as radically distinct, even if Juul gradually retreated from his initial 
formulation as "too strong" (Juul, 2013). Juul's Trench stands not just for the specifics 
of Juul's argument concerning the temporality of videogames, but for its ultimate 
premise – that videogames must be treated as unique artefacts if they are to be properly 
understood. Regardless of which aspect of videogames is asserted as the locus of their 
ontological disconnection from narrative media, I shall refer to the resultant divide as 
Juul's Trench, and argue that it has become too problematic to be maintained. 
FICTION DENIAL 
While Juul's Trench was geared towards preventing invasion by other academic 
disciplines, it is also emblematic of the ideological exclusion of the importance of 
fiction and representation for games as objects of study. I use the term 'fiction' here in 
the sense used by Kendall L. Walton (1990), as a synonym for 'representation' that 
stresses the imaginative consequences of a specific representational element regardless 
of its medium or genre of origin. The downplaying of the importance of fiction for 
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understanding games and play is a key aspect of the videogame exceptionalism this 
paper challenges. This fiction denial is neatly epitomized by another influential member 
of the formative game studies community, namely Espen Aarseth, when he picks up 
the baton from Juul: 
As the Danish theorist and game designer Jesper Juul has pointed out... games 
are eminently themeable: you can play chess with some rocks in the mud, or 
with pieces that look like the Simpson family rather than kings and queens. It 
would still be the same game. The "royal" theme of the traditional pieces is all 
but irrelevant to our understanding of chess. Likewise, the dimensions of Lara 
Croft's body, already analyzed to death by film theorists, are irrelevant to me 
as a player, because a different-looking body would not make me play 
differently... When I play, I don't even see her body, but see through it and past 
it (Aarseth, 2004). 
I have no reason to doubt the veracity of Aarseth's remarks about Lara Croft's body, 
but it is far from clear that this is a fact about either Tomb Raider (Core Design, 1996) 
or its players – it appears, rather, to be a fact about Espen Aarseth. On the basis of my 
case studies of players, I cannot agree that the appearance of any given character model 
is "irrelevant" to all players. A waif-like Lara Croft implies a very different role to an 
obese Lara, and a robotic or lagomorphic Lara implies something different again. For 
players who actively engage in roleplay – and this is a significant proportion of 
videogame players (Bateman and Boon, 2006) – representation always matters. 
Speaking for myself, I am frequently more engaged in this kind of play within the 
fictional worlds of videogames than what the ideal player might be expected to 
undertake – a situation which would fit comfortably under what Aarseth has praised as 
transgressive play (Aarseth, 2007). 
As can be seen from the above quote, fiction denial entails an ontological claim that it 
is the game mechanics, the rules, that are the real part of the game, as is also claimed 
by Juul (2005). To give an additional example, Graeme Kirkpatrick approvingly cites 
the above Aarseth quotation (Kirkpatrick, 2011, p. 132) and refers to Juul's work (Juul, 
2006, p. 135) to note that "it is common for gamers to lose all interest in the fiction 
projected by the game’s interface and to switch their focus onto the rules" (Kirkpatrick, 
2011, p. 27). Kirkpatrick suggests that while representation occurs in videogames, and 
it is "necessary" to discuss videogame fiction, it occurs in a "curiously muted way that 
has few cultural precedents" (Kirkpatrick, 2011, p. 160). According to Kirkpatrick, a 
necessary stage of the player's engagement with the game is the backgrounding of the 
fiction, which entails "a move away from concern with the fictional world as a setting" 
(Kirkpatrick, 2011, p. 69). 
While I concede that what Kirkpatrick provides is a valid description of certain forms 
of videogame play, it is once again only a description of the play experiences of a 
certain kind of player. It is also not unique to videogames, since similar concerns are 
apparent with tabletop games, particularly contemporary 'hobby games'. Furthermore, 
for those players who do fully engage with the fiction of a videogame this 'seeing 
through' to the rules must be judged an aesthetic flaw since it breaks with what is 
conventionally termed immersion (Murray, 1998). From this perspective, it is not that 
the player 'sees through' the fiction, but the rules 'tear through' the world. Only an ironic 
ghost train rider wants to see the gears – or perhaps someone who makes or studies 
ghost trains, and wants to understand how they are put together. 
We should therefore be wary of jumping from the premise '(some) players of (some) 
videogames see through the fiction to the rules' to the conclusion 'the rules are real and 
important while the fiction is incidental'. This judgement not only depends upon what 
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sense of 'real' is being used, it depends upon the psychology of the player in question. 
To suggest that for players of World of Warcraft (Blizzard, 2004) it is solely the 
effective statistics of weaponry and armour that determine the criteria for their selection 
would be to wilfully ignore key social and aesthetic aspects of the play of this game as 
it is experienced by many of its players. To suggest that for players of Animal Crossing 
(HAL Laboratory, 2001) the only relevant aspect of their chosen furnishings is the price 
would be to entirely misunderstand both the game and its players. 
THE TYRANNY OF PROCEDURES 
The archetypal form of fiction denial described above lies in the concept, defined by 
Aarseth and espoused as aesthetically important by Kirkpatrick, that rules are the true 
substrate of games while fiction is a mere interchangeable wrapping of minimal 
importance, or (equivalently) that function trumps representation. Chess is the same 
game no matter what shape the pieces, therefore setting and theme do not matter, they 
are incidental (Aarseth, 2004). It is the rules that are the true essence of a game. This 
attitude, although stridently stated at times, is usually offset by a grudgingly reluctant 
acknowledgement that the fiction of a game serves some minimum purpose, perhaps 
merely as a carrot to entice players to engage with the game in the first place. 
Kirkpatrick, for instance, maintains his fiction denial even while acknowledging that: 
...if we are not interested in our character and what is happening to them then 
we will not be interested in playing the game and if we do not continue to take 
an interest in the unfolding of the game’s storyline (however thin it is) then we 
will not really be able to play because the things we are doing (manipulating 
objects, creating changes on screen and listening to sounds) will not mean 
anything to us (Kirkpatrick, 2011, p. 159). 
A more sophisticated form of fiction denial occurs within the school of thought known 
as proceduralism, the point of origin for which Miguel Sicart locates in Janet Murray's 
(1998) suggestion that "digital games are unique, among other things, because of their 
procedural nature" (Sicart, 2011). While reluctant to single out a specific academic as 
the locus of the movement, Sicart nonetheless focuses his attention primarily upon Ian 
Bogost on account of the "popularity and influence of Bogost's work, both in academia 
and in the games industry" (ibid).  
Sicart recognises the importance of Bogost's theories of procedural rhetoric, 
highlighting the "elegance and complexity" of the approach and calling it "a landmark 
of game studies" (ibid) – but he also cautions that we not accept the proceduralist's 
logic prematurely. Following that logic entails that the meaning of a game is implicit 
to its rules and, furthermore, that the behaviour of players is specified primarily by the 
design of its rules. It follows, therefore, that "the meaning of the game, and of play, 
evolves from the way the game has been created and not how it is played; not to 
mention when and where it is played, and by whom" (ibid). 
It is a simple matter to confirm Sicart's claims against the proceduralists – consider this 
one illustrative quote from Bogost: 
The rules do not merely create the experience of play—they also construct the 
meaning of the game. That is to say, the gestures, experiences, and interactions 
a game’s rules allow (and disallow) make up the game’s significance. Video 
games represent processes in the material world—war, urban planning, sports, 
and so forth – and create new possibility spaces for exploring those topics. That 
representation is composed of the rules themselves. We encounter the meaning 
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of games by exploring their possibility spaces. And we explore their possibility 
spaces through play (Bogost, 2008). 
In one respect, this attitude is a vast improvement over the fiction denial of 'seeing 
through' epitomized by Aarseth and Kirkpatrick, since it recognises that videogames 
are indeed representational and affords importance to that representation. But rather 
than situating this in the fictional content of games, proceduralism continues to operate 
within Juul's Trench and places the representational importance entirely within the 
rules: "The representation is composed of the rules themselves" (ibid). This is a far 
more sophisticated kind of fiction denial, one that acknowledges the importance of 
fiction but still claims the exceptionalism of videogames by asserting that this medium 
is not dependent upon conventional techniques of depiction or narration but instead 
offers an entirely unique kind of procedural representation entirely contained within 
the rules of the game. 
But this claim cannot go through, since the meaning of any given rule could not 
possibly reside purely in the mechanical description of its rules. On the contrary, the 
representational aspects of rules must necessarily entail both function and fiction – if 
they did not, the rules would solely describe logical and mathematical relations; they 
would be capable of representing solely in the way that mathematics is itself a form of 
representation – a representation of cardinality (Yablo, 2002). For the rules of a 
videogame to represent "war, urban planning, sports, and so forth" the representation 
cannot be "composed of the rules themselves" as Bogost (2008) claims, at least not 
alone. Rules and fiction must work together, as I have argued elsewhere (2011). 
Sicart provides a specific counter-example to the rhetorical claims of procedural 
rhetoric. Pointing to Jason Rohrer's artgame Passage (Rohrer, 2008), Sicart observes 
that the creator of this game "explicitly claims that the game has many interpretations 
for different players" but still provides an author statement that necessarily frames that 
interpretation. As Sicart then challenges: "If rules contain the meaning, what is the need 
for an author statement?" (Sicart, 2011). Just as I argued previously that Aarseth's 
fiction denial fails to take into account the diversity of player experience, so Sicart takes 
the experience of play as contradicting the strong claims of the proceduralist school by 
suggesting that play "is an act of appropriation of the game by players" (ibid) – which 
once again connects with Aarseth's notion of transgressive play (Aarseth, 2007). 
The proceduralist argument seen from Sicart's perspective becomes tyrannous, because 
it is the game designer who is the sole arbiter of the meaning of a game – they 
(allegedly) inscribe a videogame with inviolable meaning by the design of its rules and 
procedures. Against this, Sicart offers play as "personal, individual, and 
communitarian, played with others, for others, in an intensely, deeply personal way" 
(Sicart, 2011) – and on this point I am in agreement with him. But the imagined 
autocracy of procedures is also a form of fiction denial, and an attempt to enforce the 
videogame exceptionalism this paper asks us to both question and resist. 
DANCING WITH OUR HANDS 
Perhaps the most fascinating manifestation of fiction denial occurs with the aesthetic 
theory of Graeme Kirkpatrick. As already discussed, Kirkpatrick aligns behind the 
early game studies scholars in "asserting the novelty of the video game as an object of 
study and the importance of this newness to understanding its distinctive place within 
contemporary culture" (Kirkpatrick, 2011, p. 1). He begins his book of videogame 
aesthetics, therefore, by asserting exceptionalism. However, he does not rely upon other 
scholars to make his case, and in fact develops an utterly unique account of the aesthetic 
elements of videogame play based upon aesthetic theories from Immanuel Kant (1790) 
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and Theodor Adorno (1984). The sophistication of Adorno's account is beyond the 
scope of this paper, and Kirkpatrick's use of his ideas is wonderfully original, particular 
in its comparison between the experience of videogame players and the medium of 
dance. 
Viewing the locus of the videogame player experience as situated in their interaction 
with the controller, Kirkpatrick states: "To fully experience the form in a game we have 
to draw it out by playing well and we do this with our hands" (Kirkpatrick, 2011, p. 
100). He thus downplays the importance of representation in favour of performance, 
following his thesis that the aesthetic experience of digital game play occurs in the 
mastery of the specific actions the player implements with the interface device, even 
going as far as to remark that “a generation of young men have grown up dancing with 
their hands” (ibid, p. 154). 
Already we can see that Kirkpatrick's aesthetic form theory of videogames has moved 
far beyond the simplistic concerns of fiction denial he also endorses – no-one I have 
read thus far writes as eloquently about the experience of the player of videogames 
such as fighting games, or those action games that demand of their players an intense 
commitment and concentration in order to overcome their challenges. But here 
Kirkpatrick's account becomes schizophrenic, since he claims to be offering an 
aesthetic theory of videogames, but provides a description that accords solely with 
those kinds of games that demand this highly specific kind of performance, which is 
primarily those descended from the lineage of the arcade. 
The exceptionalism in Kirkpatrick's form theory is unfortunate because in the first place 
it fails to adequately describe the aesthetic experience of all genres of videogames. 
There is no 'dancing with our hands' when we are playing a non-reaction based puzzle 
game such as Bejewled (PopCap, 2001), or a tactical turn-based game like Disgaea: 
Hour of Darkness (Nippon Ichi, 2003), or a point-and-click adventure such as 
Discworld Noir (Perfect Entertainment, 1999). Indeed, if we try to understand the 
aesthetic experience of these genres of game by following the player's hands we will 
be deeply confused as to where the merits might lie in the spidery scribbles of an idly 
meandering mouse. 
Additionally, Kirkpatrick's form theory is regrettably narrow in its focus because it is 
perfectly suited to the understanding of other kinds of play that are not videogames. 
Electro-mechanical games such as pinball tables or Sega's Periscope (1966) and Duck 
Hunt (1969) are not only a clear and direct influence for the early arcade videogames 
that followed them, but Kirkpatrick’s aesthetic theory would be just as suited for 
application to these machines as contemporary videogames! The irony here is that 
Kirkpatrick has created something of fundamental importance to understanding the 
aesthetic experience of certain forms of game, but misleadingly restricts its application 
to videogames as a blanket category by unnecessarily accepting the exceptionalism of 
the early game studies scholars.  
This returns the discussion to my paraphrasing of Midgley: it is misleading to talk of 
the difference between videogames and other creative media without specifying which 
genres we are referring to – in the case of Kirkpatrick's form theory, the genres of 
videogames that are to be included, and the genres of other kinds of play that the theory 
equally applies to. Once again, there is a pressing need for 'game liberation' to resituate 
videogames as continuous with other media, including those games that predate them 
and that are deserving of the respect of those who study games and play. 
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RECONCILIATION WITH FICTION 
Having allied with the early game studies scholars in asserting videogame 
exceptionalism as "the necessary starting point for a serious understanding of video 
games", Kirkpatrick goes on to insist that "aesthetic theory rather than a rapprochement 
with fictionality" is the methodological next step for the discipline (Kirkpatrick, 2011, 
p. 50). In other words, following both Aarseth and Juul, Kirkpatrick insists in the 
maintenance of Juul's Trench and the extension of our self-imposed isolationism I have 
compared to the Japanese policy of kaikin. But if I am correct that Kirkpatrick's theory 
is an aesthetic theory of some kinds of games – and not even just some kinds of 
videogames – it is an open question whether expanding the aesthetic theories that apply 
to games would require a continual state of hostility towards the aesthetics of other 
forms of fiction. 
In Imaginary Games, I took Walton's make-believe theory of representation and 
adapted it for games of all kinds (Bateman, 2011). My purpose in this work is parallel 
to that of this paper – to argue against exceptionalism, and to position videogames as 
part of a wider continuum of play activities that includes tabletop games, narrative 
media such as novels and movies, and children's games of make-believe. Following 
Walton, I argue that representative art (including board games and videogames) can be 
understand as contiguous with, but more sophisticated than, these ad hoc games of 
youthful imagination. I stop short of providing a complete aesthetic theory, however, 
comparing this book to Kant's Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals (Kant, 1785) 
as exploring foundational considerations that mark a direction for future exploration. 
But the path that I traces is precisely what Kirkpatrick decries as "rapprochement with 
fictionality" (Kirkpatrick, 2011, p. 50) – an abandonment of Juul's Trench in order that 
the aesthetic relationship between function and representation in games, narrative 
media, and other play activities can be more clearly recognised. 
What fiction denial hides is the intimate connection between fiction and rules I 
espoused in Imaginary Games, and particularly the way the content of the fiction 
implies rules, and thus wedding the wrong kind of rules and fiction together creates an 
aesthetically displeasing game. My account builds upon some of Juul's ideas (i.e. Juul, 
2005, see Bateman, 2011, pp. 11-14, p. 62), but it is resolutely in opposition to Juul's 
Trench and any ontology that would elevate the importance of rules in relation to 
fiction.  
Following this approach, it is prudent to recognise that if fiction denial were viable in 
a context that was valid beyond the preferences of certain players, an interface designed 
for a tank could become anything. This is what Aarseth specifically argues in the 
context of Chess, after all. But this argument is clearly fallacious: the dual-stick tank 
controls of Battlezone (Atari, 1980) are suitable for controlling tanks and sci-fi or 
fantasy variations on the key of tank. Despite the implication of Aarseth's claim that 
you could 'reskin' a first-person shooter (FPS) to be anything at all, game developers 
who attempt to do so are always constrained to fictional worlds in which wielding and 
firing a gun or a gun-substitute (a magic wand, fire breath) are central experiences. 
One way to break through fiction denial is to explore the functional and representation 
implications of the props in a game. This term 'prop', originating in Walton's make-
believe theory (1990), refers to anything with representational implications, but in 
Imaginary Games I draw out the way that props also have functional consequences 
(even in supposedly non-interactive media such as film). By foregrounding the 
imaginary world, bringing the fiction into focus, and identifying the props, it is then 
possible to judge how the rules support or undermine their usage. As a matter of fact, 
this kind of thinking was already central to the way games are designed, and has been 
for over a century. The FPS is the game form that emerges from the juxtaposition of 
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the gun and the first-person camera – and refinements aside, its design follows naturally 
from these elements. The (fictional) qualities of a gun dictates the rules that can align 
with it, and thus with the players' imagination. It is not the rules that are inviolable but 
the fiction: no matter what rules you make, you cannot change the nature of a gun 
without it ceasing to be a gun. 
THE SCHOLAR DOTH PROTEST TOO MUCH, METHINKS 
I have already highlighted how fiction denial prevents Kirkpatrick from fully 
appreciating the scope and application of his innovative form theory of interface 
aesthetics, but it is prudent to show that similar blind spots occur with the other game 
studies scholars this paper has singled out for attention. In doing so, I hope to make 
clear that Aarseth, Juul and so forth are not 'the enemy' – they have all contributed 
immeasurably to our understanding of the play of videogames. But their own 
prejudices, while perhaps useful in focusing their own thought, are being picked up by 
subsequent academics (such as Kirkpatrick) and canonised as essential to game studies. 
This is the exceptionalism I am arguing against. The clearest sign that this is a genuine 
problem is that Juul's Trench continues to limit the thought of game scholars to 
videogames, even when other related media have enormous relevance to their study. 
In the case of Aarseth, despite his protestations in his influential 2004 paper, he is 
unable to hide his roots as a narratologist and thus his genuine appreciation for the ways 
that videogames create fiction in a manner parallel to other narrative media, while 
simultaneously exploring new ground. In the aforementioned paper on transgressive 
play, Aarseth presents personal anecdotal experiences from the play of Oblivion 
(Bethesda, 2006) that are inseparable from an appreciation of fiction: 
At one time of playing, I was exploring the hills northwest of the central city, 
when I came across two foresters of the imperial army who were engaged in a 
bow and arrow duel, to the death. They simply kept firing, no explanation 
given, until one of them was killed. I have no idea what could have caused this 
animosity, and I had no way to find out. There was no indication that this was 
a scripted event, and probably some small coincidence, such as one of them 
hitting the other by mistake while trying to kill a wild animal, had caused the 
fight to break out, but who knows (Aarseth, 2007, pp. 132-133). 
Except for the brief recognition that this could have been a "scripted event", and thus a 
functional aspect of this games' rules, Aarseth's appreciation of this event is clearly 
rooted in fiction – and not just in the wider representative sense, but in the specific 
sense of narrative and story. Of course, Juul's Trench allows for these present-tense 
stories emerging from play – but in sharing his sense of wonder at the personal narrative 
emerging from the play of Oblivion, Aarseth is impossibly distant from his claims that 
he 'sees through and past' the fiction to the underlying rules (Aarseth, 2004). Of course 
he does not! He is a videogame player as well as an insightful scholar of games. If he 
could not appreciate the fiction, he could not possibly appreciate videogames. 
It is slightly harder to demonstrate the same kind of excessive protestation with Juul, 
but in his discussion of games without goals or with optional goals (Juul, 2007) he is 
in a similar space to Kirkpatrick in restricting his insights too narrowly to videogames 
alone. Although this paper does draw against non-digital play in his discussion of the 
volleyball/tennis variant foursquare, Juul nonetheless seems to hide behind his own 
moat when he concludes: 
Games without enforced goals will not replace the classic goal-oriented game, 
but they open for a wide range of new player experiences as seen in the two 
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quite similar games of Sims 2 and Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas. This is the 
new style in video games, and an illustration of how contemporary video games 
are severing the ties to their historical roots in the arcade game, becoming 
something new and unique, open and expressive (Juul, 2007). 
But like Kirkpatrick, Juul's sense of the history and genealogy of games is too narrow 
– it is focussed solely on those things that would fall under the conventional usage of 
the term 'videogame'. His analysis of open and expressive games draws the wrong 
lineage when it traces videogames back to the arcade – the roots of this style of play 
come to contemporary videogames not from coin operated machines but from the 
seminal tabletop roleplaying game Dungeons and Dragons (Gygax and Arneson, 
1974), whose influence can be clearly recognized in both of the games Juul cites 
(Bateman, 2011). In the case of GTA, the lineage can be traced via explicitly stated 
influences: Grand Theft Auto from Elite (Braben and Bell, 1984), Elite from Space 
Opera (Simbaslist et al., 1980) and Traveller (Miller, 1977), and hence to D&D itself. 
Thus it was not so much a case of "severing the ties to their historical roots in the arcade 
game" so much as slowly developing the technical power to implement in software 
what was previously possible only at the tabletop. 
Lastly, the more sophisticated fiction denial of the proceduralists can take on a different 
slant by examining the motives behind Bogost's systematic investigation of the parallels 
between the functionality of both traditional narrative media and videogames in Unit 
Operations (Bogost, 2006). This work compares Walter Benjamin's motif to the 
computational procedures of videogames in an effort to provide methods for criticism 
applicable to "any medium – poetic, literary, cinematic, computational" (Bogost, 2006, 
p. ix).  
Sicart judges this book as a point of origin for proceduralism (Sicart, 2011), which is a 
justifiable claim, and by being focussed on function to the exclusion of representation 
it does represent a form of fiction denial, as traced previously. However, Bogost 
concern is clearly and specifically to connect videogames to other media, including 
narrative media. As such, Bogost's unit operations may be a form of fiction denial, but 
they are also a denial of the relevance of Juul's Trench – in the approach to criticism 
offered by Bogost, there is no way to enforce a divide between stories and games. 
Indeed, Bogost specifically argues that techniques exist that level the critical playing 
field in this regard, admittedly techniques dependent upon a form of fiction denial. 
Thus although each of these game studies scholars supports the dominant policy of 
videogame exceptionalism in at least some of their work, each also pushes back against 
a specific aspect of it. Aarseth provides the paradigm case of fiction denial, but then 
offers accounts of the narrative experience of play that clearly engage with the 
representation. Juul offers theories of goal-optional play that allegedly break the link 
with the arcade, but that strongly demonstrate the genealogical connectivity of 
videogames to tabletop roleplaying games. Bogost provides a sophisticated, 
functionally-focused kind of fiction denial that simultaneously strides baldly across 
Juul's Trench, showing the connectivity between games and traditional narrative media 
such as novels and film.  If there is a coherent argument for maintaining this 
exceptionalist attitude towards videogames, it is not supported by the work of those 
scholars responsible for establishing it! 
GAME LIBERATION 
Videogames are a fascinating medium, but our attempts to understand them all too 
frequently flounder against the problem that the landscape of digital game artefacts is 
radically diverse. Specific videogame genres frequently align functionally or 
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aesthetically with different media to a greater extent than they do different genres of 
videogame. The text adventure is best understood in comparison to both novels and 
tabletop roleplaying games. The strategy game is inseparable from the games of Avalon 
Hill that established key tenets of the form long before digital versions arrived 
(Bateman, 2011). The action-oriented blockbuster videogame has more in common 
with movies than it does either of these videogame genres. We fool ourselves if we 
think 1958 is of particular importance to videogames because of Tennis for Two 
(Higinbotham, 1958) rather than Avalon Hill's Tactics II (Roberts, 1958), or that the 
appearance of the former is a more significant event for commercial videogames than 
the publication of The Lord of the Rings four years earlier (Tolkien, 1954-5). 
If videogame exceptionalism was initially necessary for the foundation of game studies, 
it is now a hindrance to its clarity of vision. Just as the exceptionalism of humanity 
distorted our understanding of animals and prevented them from earning even a 
minimal degree of respect, so the exceptionalism of videogames distorts our 
understanding of play and games, and simultaneously denies the necessary respect due 
to other media – especially tabletop games and narrative media – in affecting and 
influencing the historical and genealogical development of videogames. Hence the 
urgent need for a 'game liberation' that will fill in Juul's Trench, end the digital kaikin, 
and admit that we never stopped trading ideas with other media and the disciplines that 
study those other media. 
The benefits of ending this intellectual embargo are potentially limitless. Already, 
scholars such as Britta Neitzel (2002) and Jan-Noël Thon (2009) are gainfully crossing 
the lines between narratology and videogames, expanding ways of thinking about 
perspective and points-of-view; Veli-Matti Karhulahti (2012) is combining ideas from 
Aarseth with concepts originating in poetry to gainful effect; while Bogost (2006), 
Kirkpatrick (2011) and myself (2011) are all demonstrating the merits of applying 
philosophical theories intended for other purposes to videogames and other forms of 
play. The liberation of games is already happening – it is only the official story of 
exceptionalism that lingers, fooling us into thinking that the way that videogames are 
special is radically different from the way that theatre, movies, novels, comics, poetry, 
board games and tabletop role-playing games are all special. Every medium, every 
genre, is unique and fascinating, and our understanding of them all can only be 
enhanced by recognising not only the differences but also the similarities between 
them. 
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